PGov Delegate Platform

2.2 Recognized Delegates
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PGov Delegate

Introduction

We are a team of dedicated governance enthusiasts who have been in the governance space for over four years. Our team were some of the first members involved in defi governance and we want to apply what we have learned over the years to 1inch.

Driver and Core Values:

  • Growth: Our decisions are primarily focused on the growth of the protocol. This often results in how to spend money efficiently, but even more importantly and objecting for unreasonable spends and knowing when to vote no.
  • Transparency: Clear communication with votes and explanations of reasoning, and an equivalent demand for proposals to do the same. Too often we see thousands, if not millions, being rolled up together and glossed over during proposals.
  • Accountability: Too often once a decision is done, having proper accountability becomes an afterthought. Whether it’s a DAO promise or a grant or a new program, once a DAO votes something in, we forget about it. Our goal with PGov is to both continue to check in on these decisions as well as ensure that there are proper channels set up to ensure accountability.

Conflicts of Interest:

If situations arise, we will abstain from a vote, and clearly state the conflict on the forums.

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[1IP-92] Optimizing Treasury Yield via Lending (Re-run)

We voted Yes: In favor of putting idle treasury USDC to work by allocating 2,000,000 USDC into the Aave V3 USDC market, a low-risk and liquid venue for earning yield on otherwise idle stablecoins.

[1IP-93] 1inch DAO Aqua Revenue Stream Incubator

We voted Yes: In favor of standing up the Aqua Revenue Stream Incubator, which deploys up to $400,000 to seed teams building 1inch Aqua strategies, with the Grant Reviewers and core team gating which strategies receive funding.

[1IP-94] Renewal of Engagement of MME as External Counsel to the 1inch DAO

We voted Yes: In favor of renewing MME as external legal counsel on a $15,000 as-needed retainer; continued access to counsel for dispute resolution and compliance is sensible, and the as-needed structure keeps the cost contained.

[1IP-95] Dispute Resolution Proposal: 1inch DAO and HWLT

We voted Yes: In favor of resolving the outstanding HWLT matter as the ERA Wallet team completes the source-code publication obligations from its prior grant, closing out the dispute on the agreed terms.

[1IP-96] 1inch events Grant Proposal 2026

We voted Yes: In favor of the 2026 events grant supporting 1inch’s presence at conferences, hackathons, and community events; this is established ecosystem and developer-growth spend with a clear track record.

[1IP-97] 1inch Public Policy & Regulatory Engagement Grant Proposal 2026

We voted Yes: In favor of continuing the public policy and regulatory engagement program; proactive engagement across the US, EU, and UAE is increasingly important groundwork for a protocol of 1inch’s scale.

[1IP-98] 2026 DAO Governance Operations and Support

We voted Yes: In favor of funding dedicated governance operations for 2026; proposal lifecycle management, delegate coordination, and compliance monitoring are necessary functions, and resourcing them keeps the DAO’s process running end to end.

[1IP-99] 1inch x ETHGlobal events Grant Proposal 2026-2027

We voted Yes: In favor of the ETHGlobal events grant; the hackathon series is a direct, measurable developer-acquisition channel and a reasonable use of ecosystem funds.

[1IP 100] Recognized Delegate Program Renewal

We voted Yes: In favor of renewing the Recognized Delegate Program; the updated performance tiers, stricter participation metrics, and the five-delegate funding cap are reasonable improvements that keep the program accountable while continuing to professionalize 1inch governance. Disclosure: PGov is a recognized delegate and a potential beneficiary of this program.

1IP-[101]: Request to and Authorisation of 1inch Foundation as Aqua Incubator Administrator

We voted Yes: This is a narrow administrative and legal authorization rather than a change to how the Aqua Incubator operates. It designates the 1inch Foundation as the off-chain administrator so the program established under 1IP-93 can actually execute enforceable grant agreements, run KYC and KYB on grantees, and pursue remedies such as audit, termination, or clawback if a team breaches its obligations. The substance of the program is unchanged, since Anode continues to run it day to day, the Grant Reviewers retain funding and milestone decisions by majority vote, and all funds remain in the DAO Operations Multi-Sig and flow directly to grantees. We are comfortable supporting this because the DAO cannot sign contracts itself, the Foundation already acts as its off-chain legal representative with established KYC and KYB infrastructure, and formalizing that authority closes an accountability gap left open by 1IP-93 without expanding spend or discretion.

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[1IP-102] Aqua/SwapVM License for 1inchDAO & Security Audit Funding

We voted Yes: Security audits are a prerequisite for deployment and a core DAO responsibility, and Aqua and SwapVM are central enough to the 2026 roadmap that funding their v1.0 through v2.0 reviews plus the discounted, network-wide OpenZeppelin retainer is a reasonable use of treasury. Consolidating the completed and upcoming audit spend into a single budget gives a clearer view of the security roadmap and lowers governance overhead, and the accompanying confirmation of the DAO’s irrevocable operational rights under the Aqua Source License 1.1, at no new cost or commercial trigger, is a net positive for the DAO’s standing on code it operates. Our one ask, echoing others in the thread, is that the completed v1.0 audit reports the $321,000 reimbursement covers be published to the 1inch security repository and flagged on the forum so delegates can verify the retroactive portion, ideally around the time of disbursement rather than well after. With that transparency in place, funding the security program end to end is the right call.

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[Fast Track] [1IP-103] [Revote] Aqua Launch Framework: Aqua Interface Authorization, Protocol Fee Activation

We voted Yes: This completes the Aqua launch the DAO has been building toward, authorizing Degensoft to deploy the production Aqua and SwapVM contracts, operate the official Aqua interface, and switch on 100% of protocol fees to the Treasury. Turning on a fee stream that currently accrues nowhere is the most direct win here, and consolidating interface operation under a single accountable operator follows the same logic the DAO applied in the 1IP-88 dApp transfer. Consistent with our Yes on the 1IP-102 license confirmation, we are comfortable with the deployment consent resting on the DAO-funded audit program, though we would still like those completed audit reports published as we flagged on that vote. Keeping the liquidity-incentive budget on a separate standard-track proposal is the right call, since it lets the deployment, interface, and fee-activation decisions be judged on their own merits.

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[1IP-104] Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement

We voted Yes: Adopting SEAL’s Whitehat Safe Harbor gives 1inch a pre-agreed, legally-scoped way for whitehats to intervene during an active exploit and return rescued funds, rather than improvising mid-crisis, and it aligns 1inch with a standard that Uniswap, zkSync, Pendle, Pancakeswap, and Balancer already use. The design is conservative in the right places: rescued funds are non-retainable and must go in full to protocol-controlled recovery addresses within 72 hours, the bounty is a 10% share capped at $500k, and intervention is limited to genuine active exploits rather than routine testing or bug-bounty reporting. On the one concern raised in the thread, that the $500k cap looks low next to the Uniswap and Aave figures, we find the team’s reasoning sound: pinning the cap to 1inch’s existing HackenProof bug-bounty maximum keeps the two programs at parity and avoids a perverse incentive to let funds reach risk rather than disclose a bug early. This is a low-cost, high-value security improvement with no treasury outlay unless funds are actually recovered, so we support it.

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[1IP-105] Aqua LP Incentive Program

We voted Yes: This is the DAO’s budget contribution to the Aqua launch, deliberately split out from the Launch Framework so it can be judged on its own: up to 500,000 USDC over three months to seed maker liquidity, stacked on the 10M 1INCH base campaigns the Foundation already funds on the same markets. The design is well-scoped, since rewards are paid pro-rata to processed volume rather than parked TVL, so the budget only pays where flow actually routes through Aqua and the same activity that earns makers rewards is what accrues protocol fees to the Treasury under the launch we approved. The safeguards are reasonable, with address blacklists, taker-maker exclusion, per-wallet caps, wash-trading filters, open-venue-only markets, and unspent funds returned, and Degensoft administers it without drawing compensation from this budget. Consistent with our support across the Aqua program from the Incubator through the Launch Framework, seeding the liquidity layer is the natural next step, so we support the allocation.