Curia Delegate Thread

2.2 Recognized Delegates
21

[1IP-86] Treasury Funding for 2025 Security Audits of New & Upgraded Protocols

Vote:Yes

Rationale: We are voting ‘Yes’ for this proposal because its core objective: funding comprehensive security audits for all 2025 development, is an essential and non-negotiable investment in protecting user funds and the protocol’s integrity. That said, we believe the proposal should have included a more detailed budget breakdown, a list of prospective third-party auditors, and a clearer roadmap to allow for more thorough DAO oversight. Despite these omissions, the critical importance of securing our upcoming roadmap outweighs these concerns. We trust and believe that the 1inch team will execute this mandate with the diligence and transparency the DAO expects.

22

[1IP-87] Snapshot Pro Subscription

Vote: Yes

Rationale: This subscription is essential to restore the delegation functionality our entire governance system relies on. The modest $6,000 annual fee is a necessary and cost-effective expenditure to avoid significant disruption and ensure the DAO’s continued operation.

23

[1IP-88] Transfer Of Control Of The 1inch dApp To 1inch/ Degensoft Group; Domain Separation And Brand Alignment

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We are voting ‘Yes’ on this proposal as it represents a crucial step in aligning responsibilities within the 1inch ecosystem. This proposal correctly assigns the operational agility and accountability required to run the dApp to the Degensoft Group, freeing the DAO to focus on its core strength: governance and stewardship of the open-source protocols. We believe this clear separation prevents conflicts and promotes independent sustainability for both entities, ultimately strengthening the entire network.

24

[1IP-89] Update to Resolver Access Requirements for Fusion Order Flow

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We support removing the 5% Unicorn Power staking requirement for Fusion resolvers because will significantly lower the barrier to entry, which is essential for fostering competition and increasing liquidity depth within the ecosystem. The continued reliance on robust due diligence verification ensures that accountability and risk management standards are maintained, allowing the protocol to benefit from broader resolver participation without compromising integrity or security.

25

1inch x Messari: Protocol Services Quarterly Research Proposal 2025

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We support engaging Messari for ongoing quarterly research coverage as it provides standardized, third-party analysis that strengthens transparency for delegates, contributors, and external stakeholders evaluating the protocol. The cost is well-calibrated relative to the institutional credibility and discoverability that Messari’s distribution channels bring, and a quarterly cadence ensures the DAO’s activity is consistently documented in formats that traditional finance audiences and integrators rely on.

[1IP-XX] Optimizing Treasury Yield via Lending

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We support deploying $2M of idle stablecoin reserves into established lending markets, as the DAO’s prior allocations to Aave and Maker have already generated meaningful, low-risk yield that compounds the treasury’s runway without adding operational overhead. Sizing the deployment to roughly half of available idle stables preserves ample liquidity for grants, operating expenses, and unexpected DAO needs, striking the right balance between capital efficiency and treasury resilience.

[1IP-XX] 1inch DAO Aqua Revenue Stream Incubator

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We support the Aqua incubator model because it directs grant capital toward initiatives that can contribute back to protocol revenue, rather than diffuse, hard-to-measure ecosystem spend. The $400K allocation is sized appropriately for an experimental program, and structuring funding around teams building Aqua strategies aligns developer incentives with 1inch’s competitive positioning in solver-based execution.

[1IP-XX] Optimizing Treasury Yield via Lending (re-vote)

Vote: Yes

Rationale: This is a re-vote of the prior treasury yield proposal, and our position remains unchanged. Deploying $2M of idle stables into established lending venues is a prudent use of treasury assets given the DAO’s positive track record with Aave and Maker, and the conservative deployment size preserves sufficient liquidity for ongoing operational needs.

[1IP-94] Renewal of Engagement of MME as External Counsel to the 1inch DAO

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We support renewing MME’s engagement as external counsel because consistent, qualified legal support is critical infrastructure for a DAO operating across multiple jurisdictions and counterparties. Their prior deliverables, particularly work toward standardized grant agreements, directly reduce the DAO’s exposure to enforceability risk and the kind of disputes that have arisen from loosely structured engagements in the past.

Dispute Resolution Proposal: 1inch DAO and HWLT

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We support this resolution as it provides a pragmatic path to closing out the IP-30 obligations while protecting the commercial viability of the ERA Wallet through a Business Source License with a defined transition to GPLv3 in 2029. This approach honors the DAO’s interest in eventual open-source release without forcing a premature licensing decision that could undermine the product’s early market position, and it sets a useful precedent for how future grant disputes can be resolved constructively rather than escalated.

26

[1RC] 1inch Events Grant Proposal 2026

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We support funding the 2026 events program because sustained physical presence at developer-focused universities and major industry conferences is one of the more cost-effective channels for rebuilding mindshare in key markets, particularly the US. The proposed mix targets both technical talent and institutional partners, which are the two audiences most relevant to 1inch’s longer-term distribution and integration strategy.

[1IP-97] 1inch Public Policy & Regulatory Engagement Grant Proposal 2026

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We support this proposal because 2026 is the window in which the rules governing 1inch’s operating environment are actually being written, with the CLARITY Act in Senate Banking, MiCA implementation underway, and VARA developing its DeFi licensing framework. The 2025 allocation produced a documented, verifiable record of engagement rather than vague outreach claims, which gives reasonable confidence in execution, and the cost of a single enforcement action would exceed this budget by orders of magnitude.

[1IP-98] 2026 DAO Governance Operations and Support

Vote: Yes

Rationale: Governance operations are the function that keeps the 1IP lifecycle, delegate coordination, and forum administration running, and the DAO cannot exercise treasury or upgrade authority without someone owning that process end-to-end. We would note that $200K is disbursed in a single tranche with no scope breakdown and no reporting commitment attached, which is a weaker accountability structure than comparable 2026 proposals, and we would encourage the team to commit to periodic reporting.

[1IP-99] 1inch <> ETHGlobal events Grant Proposal 2026-2027

Vote: Yes

Rationale: ETHGlobal remains one of the more measurable developer acquisition channels available, and tying the program to Aqua integrations gives the spend a clearer product outcome than general brand sponsorship. The refund and clawback terms, returning funds for cancelled events within 60 days and any unspent balance above 10% at reconciliation, are what make an 18-month upfront commitment acceptable, since roughly half the listed events are 2027 placeholders with no confirmed location or scope. We would expect the final report to break down cost per event and separate 1inch-specific developer engagement from aggregate attendance figures.

1 Like
27

[1IP-100] Recognized Delegate Program Renewal

Vote: Yes

Rationale: We support the renewal because it reduces total budget while raising standards, and the points-based tiering. Our one reservation is that working group involvement is worth 2 points despite there being no defined pathway for delegates to join working groups, which makes part of the score dependent on selection decisions delegates cannot influence.

[1IP-101] Request to and Authorisation of 1inch Foundation as Aqua Incubator Administrator

Vote: Yes

Rationale: 1IP-93 allocated the budget and appointed reviewers but left no entity able to sign enforceable grant agreements, which is why Aqua0 remains approved and unfunded. Authorising the Foundation as off-chain administrator resolves that without shifting funding authority, since decisions stay with the Grant Reviewers and funds stay in the Operations Multi-Sig. The broad indemnity and cost-advancement terms are a real liability the DAO takes on, but they are the standard price of getting a counterparty willing to execute contracts on the DAO’s behalf, and the ability to revoke by Snapshot preserves the DAO’s control.

[1IP-102] Aqua/SwapVM License for 1inchDAO & Security Audit Funding

Vote: Yes

Rationale: Audits are a precondition for deploying Aqua and SwapVM, the $1.2M allocation is below the $1,359,000 the DAO approved under 1IP-86 for 2025, and all reports are published publicly on GitHub. The license confirmation also removes a real ambiguity about whether the DAO’s own deployments could trigger a Commercial License under the Aqua Source License 1.1.

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[Fast Track] [1IP-103] Aqua Launch Framework: Aqua Interface Authorization, Protocol Fee Activation

Vote: Yes

Rationale: This is the first proposal in the Aqua sequence that sends value back to the Treasury rather than out of it, with 100% of protocol fees accruing to the DAO, taken from the maker’s share so taker quotes are unaffected, and no Treasury spending requested. Fee parameters, collection routing, and conversion composition all remain under governance control, and deferring Degensoft’s service compensation to a separate standard-track proposal is the right sequencing.

[1IP-104] Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement

Vote: Yes

Rationale: Safe Harbor gives whitehats a defined legal path to intervene during an active exploit, which is exactly the scenario where responsible disclosure is too slow to save funds. Adoption costs the DAO nothing, extends coverage to the newly deployed Aqua and SwapVM contracts, and the agreement is taken in standard form with material changes to scope, bounty terms, or recovery addresses reserved to a governance vote.

[1IP-105] Aqua LP Incentive Program

Vote: Yes

Rationale: Consistent with our support across the Aqua sequence, seeding the liquidity layer is the natural next step, and paying for processed volume rather than parked TVL means the budget only spends where flow actually routes. The 50/30/20 release gated by day-30 and day-60 checkpoints and the automatic return of unspent funds give the DAO real exit points.