[1IP XX] Recognized Delegate Program Renewal

2.2 Recognized Delegates
1

Simple Summary

This proposal seeks to renew the 1inch Recognized Delegates Program (RDP) for another term, incorporating updated performance requirements, revised compensation tiers, and stricter participation metrics to ensure high-quality governance participation.

Abstract

The Recognized Delegates Program was established to incentivize active participation and professionalize 1inch DAO governance. Building on the previous term’s success, this proposal suggests renewing the Recognized Delegates Program (RDP) by 12 months and funding it with **212,400 USDC**. This is a reduction from the previous budget while improving performance standards for delegates.

Motivation

The Recognized Delegates Program, proposed three years ago, has successfully incentivized high-quality delegates to contribute to the governance of the 1inch DAO and attracted new participants. Currently, five delegates with professional governance experience participate in 1inch DAO. Based on feedback from the previous cycle, we have included additional performance requirements for delegates to remain in specific tiers. We believe that proceeding with this updated version will continue to drive positive change and decentralization within the 1inch DAO.

Specification & Criteria

A Recognized Delegate is an elected, paid position held by reputable, diligent, and qualified 1inch DAO members who work closely with the team and contribute to the growth and sustainability of the 1inch DAO.

Recognized delegates fall into three categories, called “Tiers,” based on their performance. Regardless of the tier, as long as a delegate fulfills the responsibilities outlined below and is accepted via a Snapshot vote, they shall be considered a “Recognized Delegate.”

Responsibilities:

  • Read, understand, and provide feedback on governance forum posts.

  • Always vote in the best interests of the DAO and the community over personal interests.

  • Actively vote on governance proposals and explain the reasoning behind each vote when relevant.

  • Understand the 1inch Network, its key metrics, and the overall ecosystem.

Compensation

This program aims to attract and retain entities and individuals acting as governance specialists. Compensation is based on the following performance tiers:

Delegate Tier Monthly Compensation
Tier 1 100
Tier 2 1000
Tier 3 4000

Eligibility & Tier Assignment

Tier placement is determined by a points-based scoring system evaluated across the following five metrics:

Metric Criteria Points
Governance Calls Active 2
Irregular 1
Inactive 0
Working Group Involvement Yes (member of one or more) 2
No 0
Product / Proposal Delivery Yes 2
No 0
Trailing 12 month snapshot participation 90%+ 3
80% 2
70% 1
Delegation Threshold (Unicorn Power) 500000+UP 4
100000+UP 2
10000+UP 1

Maximum possible score: 13 points

Tier Thresholds:

Tier assignment is based on total points accumulated across the five eligibility metrics.

  • Tier 3: 10+ points

  • Tier 2: 7–9 points

  • Tier 1: 4–6 points

Quarterly Evaluation

To remain in the program, each delegate will be evaluated quarterly against the following continuing-eligibility criteria. Delegates failing to meet these standards may be moved to a lower tier or removed from the program.

Criterion Requirement
Voting Participation >80% of all votes in the quarter
Rationales Rationales posted for >80% of votes in the quarter, published on the communication thread within one week of each vote

Delegate Tiers Calculation

Delegate Voting Participation %
Arana 100%
Anode 100%
Curia 100%
DAOplomats 100%
Franklin DAO 82.35%
PGov 17.65%
Delegate Governance Calls Working Groups Product/Proposal Unicorn Power Voting Participation Total Tiers
Anode 2 2 2 4 3 13 3
Arana Digital 2 2 2 2 3 11 3
Curia 2 0 0 2 3 7 2
DAOplomats 2 2 2 4 3 13 3
Franklin DAO 0 0 0 2 2 4 1
PGov 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA

Evaluation

The proposer will evaluate delegate participation and performance each quarter and suggest any updates to the compensation to the Operations Multi-sig. The first performance review will be in September 2026, for the quarter starting October 2026.

Rationale

Recognized delegates play an important role in providing third-party feedback for 1inch DAO proposals. Each delegate brings unique expertise and participates in various working groups. This renewal promotes further decentralization and community-led governance by retaining current talent and providing incentives for new delegates to increase their activity.

Considerations

The budget includes a sufficient buffer for existing delegates to climb tiers and for new delegates to join the cohort. The Operations Multi-sig shall return any unused funds to the DAO treasury at the end of the program.

1 Like
[Discussion] Recognized Delegates Program Renewal
2

Hey guys! Thanks for taking the initiative on this RD renewal proposal.

I have some feedback from the core team:

A few things need to be tightened before this is ready to advance. I’ve grouped them below with specific recommendations and, where relevant, how peer DAOs handle the same issues.

1. Operations Multi-sig — needs a reference

The proposal routes 212,400 USDC to an “Operations Multi-sig” and assigns it quarterly evaluation authority, but doesn’t define it. Who are the signers? What’s the quorum? Is this the existing DAO treasury multisig or a separate wallet?

Ask: Add a section that identifies the multi-sig by address, lists signers, and states the quorum. If it already exists, reference the governance vote that created it. If it’s new, its creation needs to be part of this proposal.

2. Evaluator independence — the proposer can’t grade themselves

DAOplomats authored this proposal, scores Tier 3 (the highest-paid tier), and is designated as the sole evaluator of all delegates including themselves. That’s a conflict of interest that won’t hold up to scrutiny.

Recommendation: Hand evaluation to an independent body. Options:

  • The Treasury Management Working Group (already exists, 3 members, 1-year terms — mandated to enforce accountability on funded programs per the Guidelines).
  • A small Evaluation Committee of 2–3 members drawn from non-delegate DAO contributors, elected alongside this proposal.

For reference: Uniswap uses a separate Accountability Committee (distinct from the delegates being evaluated) to administer their Delegate Reward Initiative and verify monthly participation. Aave’s Orbit program is administered by ACI, but ACI itself is not an Orbit-eligible delegate — service providers are explicitly excluded from the compensation pool. Both models prevent the evaluator from being a beneficiary.

Whatever structure you choose, the evaluator should not be a compensated delegate in the same program.

3. Program start and end dates — be explicit

The proposal says 12 months and references a first review in September 2026 for the quarter starting October 2026, but the actual start date isn’t stated. This matters for budget accounting, the evaluation calendar, and when delegates begin accruing compensation.

Ask: Add explicit start and end dates (e.g., “July 1, 2026 through June 30, 2027”) and align the quarterly review schedule to those dates.

4. Budget math — show the work and cap the exposure

The 212,400 USDC total for 12 months needs supporting math. Based on the current tier assignments:

  • 3 delegates at Tier 3 ($4,000/month) = $12,000/month
  • 1 delegate at Tier 2 ($1,000/month) = $1,000/month
  • 1 delegate at Tier 1 ($100/month) = $100/month
  • PGov at NA = $0/month

Current monthly run rate: ~$13,100. Annual: ~$157,200. That leaves a ~$55,200 buffer (26% of total budget).

The proposal says the buffer covers existing delegates climbing tiers and new delegates joining, but there’s no cap on how many delegates can be funded. If 3 new delegates join at Tier 3, that’s an extra $12,000/month or $144,000/year — far exceeding the buffer.

Recommendation: Add a maximum delegate cap (e.g., 8–10 funded positions) and include a budget scenario table showing the maximum monthly spend if all positions are filled at the highest eligible tier. This is standard practice:

  • Uniswap caps their Delegate Reward Initiative at 15 funded delegates with a fixed budget of $540,000 per 6-month cycle ($6,000/month max per delegate). If more than 15 qualify, the top 15 by score are funded.
  • Aave’s Orbit Q1–Q2 2026 renewal funds 4 eligible delegates with a 150,000 GHO budget over 6 months.

Both programs define the maximum number of funded positions upfront so the DAO knows its maximum exposure before voting.

5. Unicorn Power changes mid-term — define the mechanism

The scoring system awards up to 4 points for Unicorn Power thresholds (500K+ UP for maximum). But UP can change at any time as delegators move their tokens. The proposal doesn’t say what happens if a delegate drops below their tier’s UP threshold between quarterly reviews.

Ask: Define whether UP is evaluated only at quarterly checkpoints, or whether a sustained drop (e.g., below the threshold for 30+ consecutive days) triggers a mid-cycle reassessment. Both approaches are defensible — pick one and state it.

For context: Aave’s Orbit program sets a minimum of 20K voting power as a hard eligibility cutoff evaluated at each renewal. Uniswap evaluates delegation levels monthly. A mechanism that checks UP at quarterly reviews (aligned with the existing evaluation cycle) is probably simplest for 1inch, but it should be written down.

6. Delegate cap — prevent open-ended budget risk

Tied to the budget point above, the proposal doesn’t set a maximum number of recognized delegates. Without a cap, the program’s cost is theoretically uncapped.

Ask: Set a funded delegate cap. Based on the budget and peer DAO comparisons, 8–10 maximum funded positions would be reasonable. If more candidates qualify than positions available, rank by total points score.

7. Tier 1 compensation — what is it for?

$100/month is not meaningful compensation for any governance professional. It’s not enough to cover the time spent reading a single complex proposal, let alone active participation.

Is this intended as a “foot in the door” placeholder to keep low-activity delegates technically in the program? If so, does that serve the program’s goals, or does it just create a class of delegates who are nominally recognized but have no real incentive to engage?

Ask for clarification: Explain the purpose of Tier 1. If it’s meant as an on-ramp, consider raising it to $500/month (still modest, but at least within range of a token commitment). If it’s meant to signal “you’re barely qualifying and should step up,” state that explicitly.

8. Conflict of interest and disclosure requirements

The proposal lists responsibilities (vote in DAO’s best interests, provide feedback, etc.) but includes no conflict of interest policy. Delegates working for organizations that may benefit from 1inch governance decisions should be required to disclose those affiliations and recuse or flag when voting on related proposals.

Ask: Add a conflict of interest disclosure requirement. Uniswap’s delegate accountability framework requires disclosure when voting on proposals that affect affiliated entities. This is a minimum standard.

9. Removal procedure — spell it out

The proposal says delegates “may be moved to a lower tier or removed” after quarterly evaluation, but doesn’t define the process. Who initiates removal? Is there a notice period? Can the delegate appeal? Does removal require a Snapshot vote or is it at the evaluator’s discretion?

Ask: Add a removal section specifying: who initiates, notice period (e.g., 14 days), whether the delegate can respond, and whether removal is an evaluator decision or requires governance confirmation.

10. Fund return mechanism and timeline

The Considerations section says unused funds return to the DAO treasury “at the end of the program” but doesn’t specify when or how. What if the program ends early? What’s the deadline for returning funds?

Ask: Add a clause specifying that unused funds must be returned to the DAO treasury within 30 days of program end, with the Operations Multi-sig responsible for executing the transfer.

11. Legal risk review flag

Under the Guidelines (section 5.6.2), a legal risk review is triggered when a proposal involves new programs or when community members signal legal doubts. While this is technically a renewal, the revised compensation structure, new scoring system, and use of an Operations Multi-sig represent material changes. My recommendation is to treat this as triggering the legal review requirement and have independent counsel confirm the structure before Phase 3.

3

gm @RoundElephant

thanks for the thorough review. Going point by point; v2 of the proposal incorporates these.

1. Operations Multi-sig

The Operations Multi-sig is the existing 1inch DAO operations fund — a long-standing 3-of-4 multisig at eth:0x45e84e10e8E85c583C002A40007D10629EF80fAF, documented in the official 1inch docs. Signers:

  • DAOplomats (DAOplomats.pod.xyz)
  • Anode, formerly StableLab (0xea172676E4105e92Cc52DBf45fD93b274eC96676)
  • Jordan, 1inch Foundation (roundelephant.eth)
  • Belac, 1inch Foundation

Quorum: 3 of 4. v2 adds this reference directly to the Specification section so the structure is explicit. No new wallet creation needed.

2. Evaluator independence

Fair concern — the proposer can’t grade themselves. The Operations Multi-sig itself resolves this without inventing a new body. The Operations Multi-sig and the OPS Working Group are the same membership, and 2 of the 4 signers (Jordan, Belac) are 1inch Foundation reps with no compensation tied to RDP. With a 3/4 threshold, the two compensated delegates on the multisig (DAOplomats, Anode) cannot reach quorum without at least one Foundation signer’s approval — meaning evaluations and compensation adjustments can never be self-approved.

Process in v2:

  1. Proposer publishes quarterly evaluation metrics on-forum within 14 days of quarter-end (voting participation, rationales, tier scoring)
  2. Jordan / Governance Coordinator (1inch Foundation, roundelephant.eth) reviews the metrics and signs off on tier assignments via the 3/4 Operations Multi-sig
  3. Compensation adjustments execute from the multisig only after sign-off

Uses an already-elected body with built-in counter-balancing, doesn’t add structural overhead, and is consistent with how peer DAOs handle this (Aave’s ACI-administered Orbit, Uniswap’s Accountability Committee).

3. Program dates

June 1, 2026 through May 30, 2027. Quarterly reviews end August 31, 2026; November 30, 2026; February 28, 2027; May 31, 2027. The first evaluation lands at the end of August 2026, which determines tier placement and full-cap funding for the remainder of the program.

4 & 6. Budget math and delegate cap

v2 restructures the budget around a phased rollout:

  • June – August 2026 (current roster, 3 months): 3×T3 + 1×T2 + 1×T1 = $13,100/month × 3 = $39,300
  • September 2026 – May 2027 (post-evaluation, 9 months at full cap): 5×T3 = $20,000/month × 9 = $180,000
  • Buffer: $700
  • Total: $220,000 USDC

Funded delegate cap: 5 Tier 3 positions, applied after the first evaluation at end of August 2026. If more than 5 qualify in a given quarter, funding is allocated in rank order by total points, with tiebreakers (1) voting participation %, (2) Unicorn Power, (3) governance call attendance. Maximum monthly exposure post-evaluation: $20,000.

5. Unicorn Power evaluation timing

v2 specifies: UP is evaluated only at quarterly checkpoints, using a snapshot on the last day of the review quarter. Mid-cycle fluctuations do not trigger reassessment — aligned with the existing review cadence.

7. Tier 1 compensation

Keeping Tier 1 at $100/month and being explicit about why in v2: it’s not meant as fair compensation for the workload — it’s an on-ramp and a recognition rung. The intent is to gamify progression. A delegate putting in the work to read proposals, attend calls, and post rationales will quickly accumulate enough points to climb to Tier 2 ($1,000) or Tier 3 ($4,000). Tier 1 exists to lower the barrier to entry for new contributors and create visible upward motion, not to be a destination. Rationale added to the Compensation section so intent is on the record.

8. Conflict of interest disclosure

Member conduct is already governed by DAO Guidelines §5.3.2, and §5.6.2’s Proposal Risk Review process exists to flag conflicts at the proposal level. v2 adds a delegate-specific disclosure requirement to the Responsibilities section: Recognized Delegates must publicly disclose, in their communication thread, any affiliation with entities that have business relationships with the 1inch Network or that may benefit from 1inch governance decisions, and flag conflicts and recuse from voting on related proposals. Disclosures updated within 14 days of any material change. This sits on top of the Guidelines, not in conflict with them.

9. Removal procedure

v2 adds a Removal Procedure section:

  • Tier downgrade is triggered by quarterly evaluation and verified by Jordan, Current Governances coordinator ( or representative from the 1inch Foundation), effective the following month. The affected delegate has 14 days from publication of evaluation metrics to respond on-forum.
  • Full removal from the program requires OPS WG sign-off (simple majority). Initiation may come from the OPS WG following quarterly evaluation, or from any DAO member via forum post citing a breach of responsibilities.
  • Compensation prorated and paid through the date of removal.
  • Disputes unresolved on-forum within 30 days escalate per Guidelines §5.7.

10. Fund return mechanism

Treasury principles in Guidelines §5.5.2 (Accountability, Trust and Transparency) already require return of unused funds. v2 specifies: unused funds return to the primary DAO Treasury (eth:0x7951c7ef839e26F63DA87a42C9a87986507f1c07) within 30 days of program end, executed by the Operations Multi-sig. If the program is terminated early via Snapshot, the same 30-day window applies from the termination date.

11. Legal risk review

Agreed. Even though this is a renewal, the new compensation tiers, points-based scoring, formalized evaluator process, and explicit Operations Multi-sig role are material changes that fall under Guidelines §5.6.2. v2 includes a commitment to legal risk review before advancing to Phase 3, with counsel feedback incorporated ahead of the Snapshot vote.

I also want to add a note about the Treasury management WG comment

I cant find any official mandate or section process for the mentioned Working Group. While the 1inch DAO guidelines have introduced the working group. The working group is not established or elected members.
The currently only the Operations Working group, the Aqua Incubator and Legal WG are active in the DAO and has a direct mandate to operate.